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1. court granting summary judgment on the settlement negotiation contract. 
4 
Jay Knowlton and his wife Teresa, after Jay's long service with the Las Vegas city Police 
Department, decided that upon retirement they wanted to trade the hectic life of the city for the 
relaxation that a rural setting would provide to them. They visited the Rup~rt, Idaho, area and after 
looking at different parcels of property, they were introduced to Cary Hamilton who showed them a 
7 acre parcel of rnY',""P,,,, which he had for sale. 
7 acre parcel was a 2 acre 





to both parcels of 14C'-'1l11.-11t" were to 
foreclosed prop~rty from bank, and thereafter the KnowItons entered into contract with 
Hami Iton to purchase the 7 acre lot. The parties agr~(:d upon a purchase price of $31,250. The 
to as a down then an $25,250 at 
month. 
Even though this arrangement had been made, the Knowltons decided to pay the balance of 
the property, and on April 16, 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton tendered a check for $23,421 for the 
balance owed on the 7 acre parceL A check drawn on the personal account ofthe Knowltons was 
delivered to Hamilton on this date, and the deed was thereafter given to the KnowItons for the 7 
acre parcel by Hamilton. On April 22, 2004, Theresa Hamilton recorded the deed in Minidoka 
County. 
Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton had moved to Idaho and their desire was to build a dream home 
upon the property that they had purchased. In furtherance of this dream, after Teresa recorded the 
deed on April 22, 2004, she immediately went to the Minidoka County zoning and planning office 
5 
to start the process securmg UUJlLU1"H5 pennits for 
to anew and then allow their daughter to the modular home on the 2 acre 
parcel that they had also recently purchased. 
However, when Teresa made inquiries at the planning and zoning office with regard to 
securing building pennits for the 7 acre parcel property, she was infonned by Paul Aston, Minidoka 
County planning and zoning department head, that building pennits could not be issued. Mr. Aston 
explained that the 2 acre parcel of property on which modular home was situated, had been 
illegally subdivided from the original lot by Hamilton. Since original plat filed 
Hamilton on the subdivision where the 7 and 2 acre of property had not been amended to 
allow for splitting of the 2 acre parcel property, County ordinance would not allow construction 
on the 7 acre lot. In other words, the 7 and 2 acre plots, according to the planning and zoning 
ordinances were one lot, and would have to remain so, unless the county planning and zoning laws 
pennitted such a change. Consequently, if the Knowltons wanted to sell the 2 acre plot, and then 
build their dream home on the remaining 7 acres, they would not b~ able to separate both parcels of 
property into two different lots under the County ordinances. Mr. Hamilton's activities were in 
violation of the Minidoka County ordinances and constituted misdemeanor offenses. However, even 
though Minidoka County was aware of the illegal subdivision, no action had been taken against Mr. 
Hamilton. 
Realizing that their plan had gone awry, the Knowltons put a stop payment on the check for 
$23,421 on April 22, 2004. The Knowltons felt that they had been defrauded, however, nothing was 
done with regard to this matter until Hamilton filed suit on April 13,2008. On September 9, 2009, 
on the day set for trial, the parties entered into settlement negotiations. The agreed-upon settlement 
required Hamilton to go through the planning and zoning process to correct the illegal subdivision, 
6 
Knowltons were to "support, ... by appearing at any hearings might necessary 
commissioners or .LVJlHHi", commlssIOn or ,,1 Furthermore the Knowltons were also 
the obligation to "be supportive and assist and cooperate as necessary to get the subdivision 
approved. ,,2 
Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton signed the application and the process was commenced. However, 
and Mrs. Knowlton were not given a copy of the proposed plat for the subdivision, and after 
their own copy of the plat, they noted the placement of an easement for a driveway and 
another easement for delivery of water. and Mrs. were not consulted on 
DfCtDo:sea easements, and noted their objection to the plat informing Hamilton of that 
hearing was set in front of the Minidoka County planning and zoning on 
18, 2010, to address the issue of the proposed changes to this property. Mr. and 
Knowlton were not given notice of the hearing, nor was notice of the hearing posted on their 
property as required by County ordinance.3 Consequently, and Mrs. Knowlton did not appear at 
the hearing and were not able to voice their approval or disapproval of the plat. 
In spite of the Knowltons absence from the planning and zoning hearing, Mr. Hamilton went 
forward with the application. Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton were upset that they heard about the hearing 
secondhand, and realizing that they had once again been ignored or deceived by Mr. Hamilton, they 
withdrew their support for the application by way of a letter dated February 22, 2010. 
Hamilton thereafter filed to foreclose upon his lien, but the court thereafter ordered that the 
matter should be taking care of through amendment to the complaint. After the complaint was 
amended, Hamilton filed a motion for summary judgment upon the settlement agreement. After 
1 Transcript at 5. 
2 1d. 
3 Affidavit of Jay Knowlton; see generally Minidoka County Subdivision Ordinances 3.3G 1-4. 
7 
court granted 0CWHU.H.U judgment Hamilton finding was no 
material fact to matter 
agreement. 
8 
With regard to summary judgment, it is only appropriate, if after examining pleadings, 
depositions, admissions, along with any affidavits, the court finds that "there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw . .,4 If there 
are controverted facts, they are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party.5 Likewise, 
all inferences that can be made from the must made in favor of the party opposing the 
summary judgment.6 The burden establishing that is no genuine issue 
material is upon the 7 "the contains conflicting inferences or 
v<,")VLJlULJl,. minds might reach different conclusions, a judgment must denied. liS 
to 
contract 
Even though the court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to 
the Knowltons alleged breach of the settlement agreement, the Knowltons dispute that finding in its 
entirety. The focus of the court was on its finding that the Knowltons had frustrated the purpose of 
the contract, and consequently, Hamilton did not have the opportunity to cure the defect in his 
performance which consequently defeated the purpose of the parties.9 In other words, the court 
ruled that the Knowltons actions prevented the plaintiffs performance of the contract. 
4I.R.C.P. 56 (e). 




9 Memorandum Decision Clerks Record at 74. 
9 
The court stated that the settlement agreement was to 
"successfull y subdivide the property." 10 to accomplish this fundamental purpose, 
parties had agreed to that the Knowltons would be "supportive and assist us and cooperate as 
necessary to get the subdivision approved." II These were the terms which were set into the record 
by the parties, as the parameters to guide the parties to the ultimate end of successfully subdivide in 
the property. the court's decision indicates that the Knowltons cooperation essentially 
consisted of agreeing to everything that Hamilton proposed. 
The court's ruling is speculative in ruling that Knowltons rejection application 
nr(jce~:;s could been This part of the decision important fact set forth in 
the affidavit of Knowlton, which was, that Hamilton had contacted with regard to the 
placement of the easements, and had failed to into account the Knowltons' concerns. The court, 
without any supporting evidence, did not find this to be a material issue and the court thereafter 
stated that subdivision plans, were by inference workable. The location of the easements was not a 
material factor according to the court. 
Furthermore, the court did not find that the lack of notice to the Knowltons was a material 
factor justifying the Knowltons actions. Once again, the court stated, without any supporting facts, 
that the matter could be resolved by further hearing in front ofthe commission, if the KnowItons 
were willing to cooperate. 
A. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a reciprocal and the obligation to 
fulfill the terms of the contract falls on both parties equally. 
The flaw in the court's reasoning centers on one salient fact: that is, that the court's definition 
of cooperation seems to be one in which the Knowltons were to acquiesce to everything that Mr. 
10 Id. At 73. 
11 Trial Transcript at 9. 
10 
did this matter. It is a statement of the that placement easements and 
of to hearings were important factors to Knowltons. 
with Mr. Hamilton was that he had been less than forthright about his dealings with them with 
regard to this property. Ignoring their wishes with regard to the placement of easements, along with 
failure to provide notice of the hearings, only heightened their suspicion that Mr. Knowlton was 
doing whatever wanted to do in order to accomplish his purpose. Such actions not require the 
cooperation of the Knowltons, as they are only being asked to follow or go along with the terms 
which are being dictated to them. 
All contractual performance is governed by a of good faith and fair dealing" 
is "implied by and 'requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations by 
agreement [.]"ol2 This covenant of good faith and fair dealing is reciprocal, that is, both 
parties are required to perform their contractual duties pursuant to this covenant. J3 Even though this 
is the state the law with regard to contractual obligations, according to the court's ruling, 
Hamilton's shortcomings with regard to his performance of the contract, are to be excused, while the 
Knowltons are to be punished for their "lack of cooperation." Such was the finding of the court, 
although, there was little effort on the part of Hamilton to remedy the defects in the process, even 
though he had been informed of the Knowltons' objections prior to the hearing. 
It has been further recognized that 
i]f a promisor prevents or hinders the occurrence of a condition, or the performance or return 
promise, and the condition would have occurred or the performance of the return promise 
been rendered except for such prevention or hindrance, the condition is excused and the 
actual or threatened performance of the return promise does not discharge a promisor's duty. 
12 Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208,217,177 P.3d 955, 964 (2007), 
quoting Steiner v. Ziegler-Tamura Ltd., Co. 138 Idaho 238, 242, 61 P.3d 595, 599 (2002). 
13 Okun v. Morton, 203 Cal.App.3d 805, 820, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 229 (1988). 
11 
is 
As been previously argued the Knowltons, a covenant good faith and fair dealing 
is a reciprocal obligation. The Knowltons argue that Hamilton was also conducting himself in such 
a way that he was hindering or interfering with their performance of the contract by not addressing 
the easements issue and by failing to provide notice to them of hearings on the application as 
required Minidoka ordnance. failing to address Knowltons' concerns, as well as 
proceeding with the application at the planning and zoning hearing without Knowltons 
present, is conduct which can be construed as justification for the actions. at 
this of the litigation, it be a trier of the actions the 
parties constituted a breach of settlement UI",".H'-'llH is not the 
rH",~n('>l" avenue to make such a determination based upon the this case. 
All of this to one inescapable conclusion, that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
with regard to the performance of this contract by both parties. It is pure speculation on the part of 
the court that Hamilton's defects and performance could have been cured in the future. Hamilton 
had been informed of the problems with regard to the easements and had done nothing, and there 
was no evidence put into the record in support of the motion for summary judgment by Hamilton, 
that this particular problem will be addressed in the future. Consequently, by weighing all the facts, 
it is just as reasonable to suppose that Hamilton's performance under the contract would not be 
cured in the future. The court's decision is purely speculative. 
Hamilton argues that the placement of easements was not a material issue, as Paul Aston, in 
his deposition, stated that the easements could be changed later. This argument is fallacious on two 
14 In Re Penn Traffic Company, 322 B.R. 63, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), quoting Restatement (First) of Contracts § 295 
(1932) 
12 
grounds: one, placement easements was a that wanted to 
addressed on the plat and in the application process. gets to court and 
Hamilton, regarded the Knowltons cooperation under the terms of the settlement agreement, to be 
acquiescence to whatever Hamilton decided to do on the application. Once again, without flogging 
a dead horse, such a definition of cooperation smacks more of a mandatory obligation requiring the 
Knowltons to go along with Hamilton's desires or wishes. 
Second, Ashton also testified that in order to change the location the easements after 
approval ofthe plat and the subdivision, the Knowltons would to go back through the process 
gaining approval through planning and zoning for changes to plat to location 
easements. IS This would require the Knowltons to undertake additional of time and 
along with money, to the changes. Consequently to argue that the location the 
easements was not material is just not true. 
All of the foregoing argument boils down to one overarching point that under these 
are genuine issues of material fact which should have been addressed at trial. The court's 
reliance upon its finding that the placement of the easements was not a material breach, along with 
the court's speculation that Hamilton's breach of his obligations under the contract could have been 
cured, is erroneous. Summary judgment should not have been granted under these facts. 
B. Nonperformance of the contract by both parties mandates that the matter be reset 
for trial. 
The court recognized that if the parties could not perform the contract and that the 
appropriate remedy would be to have the matter reset for triaL]6 Under the facts and circumstances 
laid out by the KnowItons in this case, the appropriate remedy in this matter would be to have the 
15 Paul Aston deposition at 35-37. Transcript at the 97. 
16 Transcript at 8. 
13 
case set for trial in its entirety. court creates a problematic resolution of 
this matter. property and placing upon the obligation to 
pay the $23,421, the court gave an official imprimatur to an illegal contract. 
It should be noted that a "contract made for the purpose of furthering any matter 
prohibited by statute is illegaL unenforceable, and void.,,17 In this case, Hamilton performed a 
subdivision of the property in question, which was contrary to Hamilton did not disclose the 
infirmity created by his actions, and the Knowltons purchased the property believing that they could 
secure building permits to build an additional house on the property. 
Additionally, as a matter of public policy, the illegality doctrine not be enforceable 
the parties are not in pari delicto or those circumstances fraud,undueinfluence,or 
duress are then relief may grunted to the innocent 18 this context, the 
Knowltons argue that if the court allows enforcement of this illegally based contract for sale ofreul 
property, the Respondents would be unjustly enriched. When a party receives a benefit to which he 
is not entitled, then that person is enriched. 19 stated above, the Knowltons are innocent parties to 
this transaction, and they are entitled to the relief which they are seeking. 
This case bears some similarities to the case of Kunz v. Lobo Lodge. Inc. 133 Idaho 608, 990 
P. 2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1999). In that case, the Plaintiff petitioned the court to enforce a lease which 
was based upon the placement of billboards, which was in contravention of municipal law. The 
District Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants based upon the unenforceability of the 
illegal contract. The court stated that "a contract 'which is made for the purpose of furthering any 
matter or thing prohibited by statute ... is void. This rule applies to every contract which is founded 
17 Wernecke v. Ste. Maries Joint School District Number 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008, 1012 (2009). 
18 Wernecke, at 147 Idaho ---,207 P.3d at 1018, fn.12. 
19 Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,200 P.3d 1153, 1162 (2009). 
14 
on a transaction se, or is prohibited statute, on ground of public policy. ",20 
court continued stating that 
no principle of law is better settled than that a party to any legal contract cannot come into a 
court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out; ... the law in short will not aid 
either party to an illegal contract; it leaves the parties where it finds them. The general rule 
is the same at law and in equity, and whether the contract is executory or executed. 21 
There is no dispute in the factual record that the subdivision performed by Hamilton was 
illegal and in violation of Minidoka ordnance. For this reason, the settlement agreement 
the creation of a new plat and submission of the same to the planning zonmg 
commission in to have official approval the back in 2001.22 
The settlement ifit had through without any '-'~"'H!JU 
this illegality. as has been explained in its Hamilton to with 
regard to notice to the Knowltons, as well as his deaf ear to their concern with to the 
placement of easements. These problems with the settlement agreement resulted in the actions 
undertaken by the Knowltons. However, by thereafter finding that the Knowltons must pay 
Hamilton, the court is enforcing an illegal contract. more appropriate resolution would have been 
to set the matter for trial for resolution on all of the claims of both parties. 
20 Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc. 133 Idaho 608, 612, 990 P. 2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999) quoting Porter v. Canyon County 
Farmer's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 45 Idaho 522, 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928). 
21 Kunz, 133 Idaho at 612,990 P. 2d at 1223, quoting Hancock v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 548, 186 P. 2d 494, 498 
(1947), quoting 17 c.J.S. Contracts § 272. 
22 See Deposition of Paul Aston at 34. 
15 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that court granting summary judgment, and 
the Appellants petition this court to so find and to remand this matter for triaL 
this of August, 2011. 
I certify that on this _. _ August, 11, I foregoing 
to the attorney for the Defendant-Respondent by depositing a copy thereof in the United 
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
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